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A Sustainability Assessment of the Tulsequah Chief Mine and Road Proposal
webmaster : Feb 7.2002Prepared by David MacKinnon
Jan 7, 2002
Introduction:
The difficulties posed by sustainability are evidenced by the fact that the authors of the first Project Committee Recommendations Report simply excluded it from the document in recommending in favour of the proposal. That glaring omission flew in the face of the explicit purposes of the Environmental Assessment Act and was duly noted first by the Taku River Tlingit First Nation and then by Madame Justice Kirkpatrick in her judicial review of the Tulsequah EA process and the subsequent issuance of a project certificate. The failure to address sustainability concerns was found to be a substantive error by Justice Kirkpatrick, compelling the reconvened Project Committee to meaningfully address a concept that has not been defined in policy or legislation by the provincial government.
Fortunately, two significant contributions were made to the sustainability discussion since the Committee was reconvened in June of 2000. The first of these is the R. Anthony Hodge report, commissioned by the Project Committee, and submitted by Dr. Hodge in May of 2001. The second was the Tom Green report, commissioned by the Environmental Mining Council of British Columbia and submitted to the Project Committee in July of 2001. Both documents clearly indicate that a body of literature exists which provides basic parameters for the sustainability discussion and for the establishment of specific sustainability criteria for the Tulsequah mine and road proposal.
While the TWA does not necessarily accept all of the findings of the Hodge report, we do agree with enough elements of it to feel it is a more useful exercise to assess the Tulsequah Chief proposal according to the Hodge criteria than to expend time critiquing it. Some central Hodge tenets that we agree with include:
1. that mining projects, to be sustainable, must be demonstrably positive in their contribution to overall human and ecological well being;
2. that human well being can not be traded off for ecological well being, or vice versa, in the determination made in tenet 1; and
3. that acceptance of the validity of the project by those affected is essential to sustainability.
On that basis, this document examines the Tulsequah Chief mine and road proposal under the Hodge lens, drawing on a range of documents that includes both the Hodge and Green reports.
The November and December Updates posted on the EAO website provide a very brief summary of the questions raised by Hodge in his sustainability lens. While the summarized questions likely provide a sufficient basis for rejecting the Tulsequah Chief proposal on the basis of sustainability, they are also vague enough that a determined assessor could find in favour of the proposal through an over-reliance on mitigation measures. As we will demonstrate below, such a possibility evaporates if the proposal is subjected to the scrutiny of the complete question set. Since it is clear that Dr. Hodge intended his lens to be a single, unified assessment tool; it would be inappropriate for the Project Committee to make their assessment based on an abridged version of the lens.
What follows is an assessment of the Tulsequah Chief mine and road proposal using the exact framing questions in the same order they were provided by Dr. Hodge. The format and wording is taken from Appendix 6 of the Hodge Background Paper entitled: The Lens in Detail: Sub-components, Assessment Questions, and Indicators.
Ecosystem Well-being (Ends)
The general question posed by Hodge is Assessment question 1.1A: will environmental conditions be maintained or improved? To assist in answering that question, he provides a number of specific indicator questions. In our analysis of those questions, we found that the Tulsequah Chief mine either will undermine or has the clear potential to undermine, rather than maintain or improve environmental conditions in all of the indicator categories.
Indicators:
A. Biological Concerns
1. Regional landscape level ecological composition, structure and function (assessment criteria: composition, structure, and function are maintained;
The Tulsequah Chief mine reactivation and road proposal would itself lead to changes that undermine landscape level ecological composition, structure and function; and the road construction in particular would generate other, even more serious changes due to the access that it would provide to other industrial users. The 1998 EAO Recommendations Report itself acknowledges that other legitimate uses of the road could result in it not being decommissioned. (EAO, 1998: 79) The “legitimate use” to which the report refers is other industrial use, such as logging and access to other mining claims. Both would require the construction of spur roads and could eventually result in accelerating development and landscape level fragmentation of the type that alters landscape function as habitat for key vertebrate and invertebrate species. (MELP, Environmental trends in British Columbia, 2000: MELP website) If road access led to forestry development in the Taku watershed, the impacts would be similar to those in coastal regions further south in British Columbia. Species dependent on early seral stages would benefit while old growth dependent species, particularly those found in valley bottoms, would be adversely affected by changes in age structure at the landscape level. An access road would also make reactivation of the Big Bull and Polaris sites more economically viable and could lead to other mining developments and pressures for more roads and against deactivation of the proposed road.
As Green indicates in his study, the landscape impacts of the Tulsequah Chief mine development would be particularly egregious in the absence of any higher level plan that might identify and protect values at that level. “Because the TCM involves such a linear intrusion into a pristine area with high environmental values, in a context where the requirements to maintain landscape level ecosystem linkages and function have yet to be identified, the TCM performs poorly.” (Green, 2001: 60)
The possibility of mitigating or preventing these landscape level changes in composition, structure and function is completely nullified by the British Columbia Mining Right of Way Act (1996). Section 6 of that Act clearly states that if an access road is deemed to be private, as the Tulsequah Chief access road would be, then “…every person desiring to use the access road for the purpose of obtaining access to an existing mineral title, or for forest harvesting or another industrial purpose, is entitled to do so.” There are no limitations on that access right except that the owner is entitled to fair compensation for allowing access. For a more detailed analysis of the legal limitations on government control of access on resource roads, refer to the legal opinion of Margot Venton of the Sierra Legal Defence Fund that has been included in this submission.
2. Terrestrial and aquatic biodiversity at the community, species and genetic levels:
The impacts on all levels of biodiversity have been well documented by independent and government researchers during both portions of this project assessment. This summary does not intend to fully cover off the impacts on biodiversity. The TWA trusts that the Project Committee will take the reports by its own scientists seriously in this regard.
Beginning with terrestrial biodiversity, there would be clear negative impacts from this project. Karen Diemert, in her February 2000 Study Design for Ungulates indicates that caribou in the Atlin area were already showing declines in the 1970s due to low calf recruitment and access impacts. A limited entry hunt was implemented “….as controlling the access was difficult.” (Diemert, 2000: Section 6.1) The proposed Spruce-Wilson road route is clearly problematic for this already sensitive herd since Diemert concludes: “Given the baseline information and seasonal distribution information now available on the caribou, consideration of displacement on this herd must be addresses (sic). The location of the final road corridor is a critical factor in long term risk to the herd.” (Ibid) Brian Fuhr, in his report Fish, Wildlife and Habitat Overview of Road Corridor Options, found that the impacts of the proposed Spruce-Wilson route would pose a high risk to caribou and other species: “A road built in the open habitats of the SWB zone of Wilson Creek would present a high risk of disturbance and mortality to moose, caribou and grizzly bear.” (Fuhr, 2000: unpaginated website version). Since the proponent has not indicated any intention to shift the road route to the Warm Bay route or any other route option, we must assume that the road layout remains as detailed in the project proposal and that it therefore puts a sensitive caribou herd at greater risk, as well as potentially impacting grizzly bears and moose.
Even ignoring the fact that industrial access to the new road would inevitably lead to placer mining impacts on accessible creeks, it is clear that the road and mine would directly and adversely impact aquatic biodiversity. Fuhr, for example, noted that the road route would allow greater access to Upper Wilson Lake, which “would probably result in depleted stocks” of arctic grayling. The road route entails a large number of creek crossings, and British Columbia’s record with respect to habitat protection at creek crossings is anything but admirable. The 2000 DFO Report No Net Loss indicates that road construction and government monitoring and enforcement under the Forest Practices Code have not been effective in avoiding habitat loss at stream crossings. To the contrary, that report showed that there were adverse habitat impacts at every stream crossing studied in two jurisdictions. There is absolutely no reason to think that creek crossings in the remote Taku region will be regulated or monitored with any greater effect given the massive cuts that will soon be affecting the British Columbia bureaucracy. The many culverts would inevitably result in habitat loss and species impacts for anadromous and non-anadromous fish in the Taku system whereas larger crossings like the Sloko Bridge and Silver Salmon River crossings are acknowledged to require habitat destruction and result in sedimentation. “Potential effects of turbidity and the loss of high quality physical habitat through stream bottom siltation are a problem to all five salmonid species and resident trout.” (US Concerns, 11/13/98: 3)
The impacts of mine operations and waste disposal have been extensively documented by the State of Alaska and by the Taku River Tlingit First Nation. To summarize, the clear water side channels of the Nakonake River, Shazah Creek (especially Shazah Slough), and the Tulsequah River are “particularly critical habitat” for Chinook and Coho. (EAO, Cumulative Impacts Assessment Report, 1998: 12; Project Report Vol. V: 3.4; Alaska White Paper) In addition to sediment effects from the construction of the road, Shazah Slough would be at considerable risk from the large tailings impoundment pond adjacent to it in the active flood plain of Shazah Creek. Due to instability of the soil there is a risk that the pond or its foundation could be damaged by a debris torrent or avalanche. (Letter from William Riley to Daphne Stancil, 01/29/01: 2) That situation “…presents unacceptable risks to binational fisheries resources.” (US Concerns, 11/13/98)
Flannigan Slough is an “extremely important” rearing and staging area for juvenile salmon from throughout the watershed; Cohos spawning and rearing in the Slough may be the single largest stock in the drainage. (State Comments: 3; ADFG’s Scoping Comments: 3; Alaska White Paper). Degradation of spawning or rearing habitat or water quality in this area, from mining or other development activity, could have substantial adverse effects on the health of anadromous fish stocks throughout the river. The mixing zone for effluent from the tailings raises concerns since Alaskan technical experts are not “comfortable that the mixing zone will not impact the biological integrity of the water body, adversely impact anadromous fish spawning and rearing, or form a barrier to migratory species.” (Alaska Response to TC Project Report, 3/6/98)
We cannot comment on the mitigation measures that the province is promoting on the proponent’s behalf since they have not been shared in their entirety with the public, but it is clearly safe to say that those mitigation measures will require close monitoring and enforcement to be in any way effective. As is the case with terrestrial mitigation efforts, the logical assumption is that such measures will be no more effective than they are currently, which is to say largely ineffective. In summary, the Tulsequah Chief proposal also fails with respect to this element of the Hodge sustainability lens.
3. Quantity and quality of terrestrial and aquatic wildlife habitat:
As noted in questions one and two above, the project proposal would lead to habitat fragmentation in terrestrial habitat, with adverse impacts on numerous species and particularly caribou. Noise and constant human activity also degrade the quality of habitat for sensitive species like mountain goats and caribou.
Aquatic habitat would be at risk in terms of quality and quantity due to sedimentation effects, riparian habitat degradation and elimination, benthic habitat degradation due to sedimentation, loss of stream habitat due to encroachment, toxic contamination, and loss of potential upstream habitat due to impassable crossings. (Harper and Quigley, 2000: v) As the DFO technical report No Net Loss of Fish Habitat: An Audit of Forest Road Crossings of Fish-Bearing Streams in British Columbia, (1996-1999) clearly demonstrates, the Forest Practices Code has not been effective in protecting stream crossings from habitat destruction and net habitat loss:
“This audit demonstrates that the FPC objectives are not being met with respect to stream crossings. “No Net Loss of fish habitat cannot be achieved with current stream crossing practices (emphasis added). A greater degree of fish habitat protection must be achieved on post-FPC stream crossings, underscoring the need for significantly increased monitoring and maintenance of stream crossings and enforcement of environmental legislation.” (Ibid: 29)
The No Net Loss report also recommended that corrugated metal pipes are inappropriate for use on fish bearing streams due to their numerous habitat impacts. (Ibid, p. 30) In spite of this, the proponent’s project report intends to install culverts on most of the stream crossings along the road route.
The habitat loss that will result from this project could bring Canada into contravention of the Habitat Provisions of the Pacific Salmon Treaty. US concerns in that respect were made clear in a presentation to the Project Committee in September of 2001:
“The Pacific Salmon Treaty, in particular, ratifies important commitments by the U.S. and Canada for salmon habitat protection and restoration that were not addressed in the original environmental assessment for the proposed Tulsequah Chief project. Specifically, both the U.S. and Canada committed to “protect and restore habitat so as to promote safe passage of adult and juvenile salmon and achieve high levels of natural production, maintain and improve safe passage of salmon to and from their natal stream, and maintain adequate water quality and quantity.” (US position statement, Project Committee meeting, 09/19-21/01)
As noted below, imminent cuts to the BC civil service mean that it is improbable if not impossible that current levels of monitoring, maintenance and enforcement will be met. The Department of Fisheries and Oceans is faced with similar limitations on staff and resources. The assurance that the Forest Practices Code will be enforced on the 69 stream crossings is therefore no assurance at all in terms of habitat protection. In fact, it more or less guarantees that there will be serious aquatic habitat damage along the entire road route.
The habitat risks associated with mine operations and the location of the effluent outflow and tailings pond were referred to briefly above.
The project proposal would seriously damage the quantity and quality of terrestrial and aquatic wildlife habitat in the area.
4. Wildlife, fish, or plant population and health status: sensitive, vulnerable, or valued species:
A number of species warrant consideration under this heading, and all of them would be placed at increased risk by the Tulsequah Chief project. The Atlin caribou herd, as noted under question one, may already be in decline and is certainly vulnerable. It is also an important traditional resource of the Taku River Tlingit. (TRTFN, 1998, unpaginated) Diemert and Fuhr concur with other biologists that the proposed road route would increase disturbances and mortality for the herd. Since caribou recover very slowly at best from impacts (Diemert, 2000), and this herd has already been found to be in decline, even a small added decline could have grave and long term consequences.
Grizzly bears are a species listed as vulnerable in British Columbia. The relatively healthy numbers of grizzly bears in the Taku will also be adversely impacted by the proposed road route (Fuhr, 2000), diminishing the region’s habitat value as such habitat diminishes and is fragmented across the province.
Salmon also warrant mention under this heading due to their vital place in the TRTFN culture and economy and their importance as a commercial species to British Columbia and Alaska. The threats to salmon have been outlined above and in numerous other submissions to the Project Committee.
Since no particularly valued, sensitive or vulnerable species will benefit from the project and at least the above three stand to be negatively impacted, the proposal fails in this aspect of sustainability.
B. Chemical Concerns
5. Propensity for or risk of acid rock/mine drainage and/or metals leaching post closure and
6. water quality:
Maintaining water quality and fishery values on the Taku River is absolutely critical to the preservation of the watershed and it’s tremendous cultural, economic and wild land values. The project review committee has identified many water quality and fishery issues of concern during the re-convened review process. It should be noted that the TWA disagrees strongly with the decision of the Project Review Committee chair to defer resolution of the outstanding water quality and fisheries issues until the permitting process for the mine. The protection of the existing water quality, habitat and cultural uses in the Taku River watershed must be assured. The Environmental Assessment Office has failed to do so by proposing to certify the Tulsequah Chief Mine without adequate review and resolution of critical issues.
Existing water quality data taken over several years shows that the water quality criteria (WQC) for many heavy metals including copper, lead, and zinc are already exceeded at both Taku River stations, and at the upper Tulsequah River station throughout the year. The Tulsequah Chief mine discharges acid mine drainage from historic underground workings into fish habitat, eliminating fish use in that area of the river. This is a violation of both Provincial and Alaska law, yet the Provincial government continues to allow the discharges.
The USEPA and the Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation have repeatedly raised concerns that the Taku River watershed lacks the assimilative capacity to accept anymore metals or acid mine drainage contamination because water quality standards are already being violated at the US/Canada border. It is illegal under Alaska law to allow uncontrolled discharges from existing mine workings and old tailings piles. Alaska law would not allow the permitting of the Tulsequah Mine to move forward given existing water quality violations. In fact, the Taku River qualifies as an “impaired water body” under Alaska law due to the persistent water quality exceedances for copper, lead, and zinc. As an impaired water body, all future wastewater discharges into the Taku River would be required to meet water quality standards at the point of discharge; no dilution would be allowed. The Provincial government should adopt these protective measures and require all current and future discharges from mines in the Taku River watershed to meet water quality standards at the point of discharge.
The Provincial government has a standing requirement for the remediation of existing historic Tulsequah Chief mine discharges to the Tulsequah river (Pollution Abatement Order under the Waste Management Act (WMA)). The Project Review Committee and the Provincial and Federal governments continue to ignore their responsibility to enforce the existing clean up order, and have instead irresponsibly pushed the permitting process ahead.
Additional water quality impacts in the Taku River watershed are anticipated due to the re-development of, and existing contamination left at other historical mines in the area. The Project Review Committee conducted modeling of water quality impacts caused by combined discharges to the Tulsequah River from the Tulsequah Chief and Polaris Taku mines. Lead, zinc, arsenic, sulphate, and copper levels in the river would increase even more, resulting in greater risk to existing fish stocks and wildlife. In addition, discharges from the Big Bull mine are ongoing, contributing to water quality degradation, and also need to be remediated.
The Provincial government’s argument that the acid mine discharges and some metals levels will be improved by developing the mine are based on a plan that Redfern has not agreed to. Predicted reductions of heavy metal levels and acid mine drainage is based on the applicant using a more sophisticated and expensive wastewater treatment system than is included in their mine development proposal. The Provincial government designed the additional wastewater treatment system for the applicant when they realized that the original mine development proposal was inadequate. To date, the applicant has not agreed to build or maintain the additional wastewater treatment system needed to treat existing mine contamination and additional contamination from re-opening the mine(s). Thus, the Provincial government’s assertion that water quality will improve when the mine is developed is flawed and based on an unproven assumption that RedCorp will agree to fund, build and maintain a much more expensive and sophisticated treatment system than they have proposed.
The Provincial government has stated that “A high degree of compliance promotion and enforcement through the WMA permitting system will protect the aquatic resources of the Tulsequah and Taku rivers from exposure to “extreme” conditions modeled in the MEMI report.” However, at the October 2001 meeting of the Project Review Committee the chair revealed the Provincial government’s imminent plans to reduce regulatory personnel that are responsible for mine permitting and oversight. The Province has announced large budget cuts and staff reductions on their web site. Thus, the assurances from the Province that they will keep a close eye on compliance during clean up of contamination and development of the Tulsequah Chief mine is doubtful and must be strongly questioned. As has been proven in the past, budget cuts to regulatory agencies result in more violations of water quality laws through inadequate oversight of construction and operations at mine sites.
From a water quality and acid mine drainage standpoint, the Tulsequah Chief proposal fails the Hodge test of sustainability.
C. Physical Concerns
7. Propensity for unanticipated physical instabilities leading to environmental degradation:
A preliminary avalanche assessment was completed 1997 as a part of the first stage of the review process. That assessment found that two winter seasons of field observations were necessary for a completely reliable avalanche assessment. Those studies have not taken place, so avalanche data remains incomplete and preliminary. That report found that there are avalanche threats to the road, tailings pond, and the mine site itself. With regard to the threats to the mine site, the authors found:
“The hazard to the proposed mine site is of a different quality than the hazard along the proposed road. While avalanche hazards on a road can be usually be (sic) managed within an acceptable level of risks, hazards to worksites, habitations, and dangerous goods storage facilities necessitate a different approach. Avalanches that could threaten those facilities will be rare, but catastrophic events (sic). Heavy precipitation accompanied by easterly winds would likely lead to the rapid loading of those start zones. While it is possible to forecast the occurrence of avalanches with a reasonable degree of accuracy (if the necessary data are available), their size and the distance they will run cannot be predicted with the required degree of accuracy. Explosives control is considered very problematic above habitations because they may be destroyed by artificially released avalanches as easily as by natural avalanches. The various pipelines, stockpiles, and storage facilities for metal-bearing or acid-generating materials could be destroyed the same way and those substances released into the environment.” (MacKenzie and Dietzfelbinger, 1997: 11)
The assessment found two converging avalanche paths that posed a threat to the mine site. In both cases, “younger timber in the runout zones indicates that large avalanches have run to within 200 m of the former mine site.” (Ibid: 6) While such an avalanche would falls into the category of a rare but catastrophic event, only one such event would be required in the history of mine operations to generate grave long-term damage to the Taku River and its salmon runs. The proposed tailings pond is also identified as at risk from avalanche and the authors differ with the proponent’s findings on that site in the Tulsequah Chief Project Report in saying, “….the lack of timber in the runout zone is caused by snow avalanches and not by a glacial scour.” (Ibid: 7)
In addition to the avalanche threat to the mine site, the authors found a total of 28 avalanche paths along the proposed road route from the limestone quarry to the confluence of the Sloko and Nakonake rivers. They identified 11 of those as posing a high hazard to the road. These hazards are only partially identified in the project report and the assessing experts do not consider the avalanche control plan outlined by the proponent adequate. (Ibid: 12)
D. Overall
8. Cumulative effects have been assessed and found to threaten the sustainability of key ecosystem components, processes, and energy flows:
The TWA is not aware of any study that indicates that cumulative effects have been assessed. Sustainability can therefore not be addressed under this heading, though the failure to adequately study cumulative effects is itself an obvious failure in terms of sustainability.
9. Restoration offsets have been established to ensure that areas to “replace” degraded areas have been identified as well as mechanisms to ensure their protection in perpetuity:
Whereas the idea of road deactivation elsewhere in the Atlin-Taku region has been mentioned by provincial biologists (personal notes, Atlin Project Review Committee meeting, 11/29/01), no such compensatory deactivation is mentioned or budgeted for in the project proposal. Similarly, the Sloko Bridge construction and two causeways in the Tulsequah River flood plain would involve unavoidable habitat destruction that will require Section 35(2) Fisheries Act authorization for harmful alterations, disruption or destruction of fish habitat as well as habitat compensation measures elsewhere. (Environmental Assessment Office, 1998: Section 5.7.3) Such measures are also not mentioned or budgeted for in the project proposal.
Without a budgetary and planning commitment to undertake restoration offsets, the project proposal necessarily fails this aspect of the sustainability assessment.
10. Treatment of environmental concerns in terms of actions designed to (a) avoid, (b) mitigate, (c) compensate; and/or (d) offset through the full project life cycle:
As mentioned above, the Province through the EAO and the Project Committee has not made the full list of such measures available to the public. That is in spite of the fact that many of the measures have been researched and developed at government and therefore public expense. The costs of such measures have generally not been incorporated into the proponent’s budget, so it is difficult to gage either the specific effectiveness of such measures, or how they affect the overall economic viability of the project.
Still, it is clear that many key concerns relate to access management and the effectiveness of that management. Please see the attached TWA document by John Nelson for a complete debunking of the notion that access management can effectively mitigate wildlife impacts. The impending gutting of the British Columbia civil service will also necessarily negatively impact the effectiveness of mitigation measures by further curtailing the monitoring and enforcement regime in the province.
It also warrants mention that the hard work of the EAO to generate mitigation measures for the Recommendations Report that might make the Tulsequah Chief appear more viable is likely wasted effort. A recent study by the Environmental Mining Council of British Columbia documents that there is a recurring problem that “recommendations made through the environmental assessment process are not incorporated into enforceable permits.” (EMCBC, 2001: 7)
With regards to actions intended to avoid, mitigate, compensate and/or offset environmental concerns, there is every indication that the project proposal fails the Hodge sustainability test.
Assessment question 1.1B: Will an acceptable environmental legacy be left by the project “over the short and long terms?
Indicators:
11. An acceptable degree of certainty exists that current and future generations will not need to:
live with a significant loss of ecological productivity/integrity and associated “ecosystem services,”
There is a high degree of certainty that current and future generations would have to live with a significant loss of ecosystem services. As noted above, the road route and related degradation of habitat structure and function would adversely affect caribou and other key game species like moose. That would directly impact on ecological productivity in terms of those species, directly affecting the Taku River Tlingit culture and economy as well as that of other local people that depend on wild game for food.
• As noted above, potential impacts on salmon could also result in such
losses being imposed upon current and future generations in Alaska and British Columbia.
Undertake Unanticipated Ecological Reclamation/Restoration
There is definitely no acceptable degree of certainty in this respect. In his sustainability study Tom Green found that “Mineral prices are highly volatile, and have generally not kept pace with inflation. The mining industry has generated low returns on investment; marginal returns lead to many mines being closed suddenly without proper decommissioning or restoration “The possibility that existing or proposed mines may face financial difficulties is real.” (Green, 2001: 35) The President of Redfern Resources himself admitted that current metals markets make the mine reactivation uneconomical at this time (personal notes, Whitehorse Public Information Session, 12/04/01).
The proponent has been the sole owner of the Tulsequah Chief property since at least 1994. There has been a pollution abatement order in effect regarding the site for the entire time, and yet the proponent has taken no effective measures to clean up the site during that time. Given the weakness of metals markets, the marginal economic viability of the mine, the undisclosed costs of mitigation and other environmental protection measures, and the fact that Redfern Resources has no history of compliance to its credit, the risk of unanticipated ecological reclamation or restoration costs falling to current and future generations has to be viewed as considerable. Such costs do not only relate to unforeseen catastrophic events, but also to the more mundane aspects of site closure and remediation.
• provide ongoing monitoring and treatment of discharges and decontamination
Since neither Redfern Resources nor RedCorp Ventures have any other properties in their portfolios, the financial accountability of both depend on the financial viability and profitability of this mine. If the mine is ever reactivated and actually lives up to the optimistic prognosis of nine years of operation, there is still no guarantee that the long term and potentially costly monitoring and treatment procedures will not be transferred to the public as they have been so often in British Columbia.
• address physical instabilities and chemical changes resulting from project activities.
As mentioned in section 7, the proponent’s avalanche analysis is not adequate and does not even mention the avalanche routes that could threaten the mine site itself. Avalanche experts do not consider the avalanche control methodology along the road route adequate. (MacKenzie and Dietzfelbinger, 1997: 12) The data shortcomings and inadequate avalanche control place workers at risk as well as jeopardizing vital salmon habitat in Shazah Slough and downstream of the mine site in the Tulsequah and main stem Taku rivers. A catastrophic avalanche event could damage the tailings pond or carry toxic substances from the mine site into the water.
Even without a catastrophic event, technical experts from the Ministry of Water, Land and Air Protection have concluded that there is a “better than even chance” that tailings seepage from the tailings pond into the Shazah wetland would require a pump back system during the life of the mine. (Personal notes from Ian Sharpe’s presentation, Atlin Project Committee meeting, 11/29/01) The pump back technology anticipated to reverse the seepage impacts is very expensive and raises concerns about whether it would be implemented if the seepage was detected at a time of marginal economics for the mine. The pump back system have to be installed with a series of wells and could potentially be required to function for up to 15 years. (Ibid) Even so, it would not be able to totally reverse copper concentrations in the wetland.
Current information is not adequate to determine the levels of metals in the natural flows through the wetland. The ministry of Water, Land and Air Protection would apparently ask the proponent to ascertain that during the permitting process.
Overall, the data shortcomings place fish habitat and salmon at inordinate risk and are contrary to sustainability.
Assessment question 1.2:
Have all key ecosystem components and implications been considered and accounted for?
Indicators:
12. Proportion of key ecosystem components considered in the proponent’s project analysis:
The fact that most of the key ecosystem components are mentioned in the project proponent’s report does not mean that they are adequately considered. As is detailed in the attached Hayes report, the wildlife information provided by the proponent is inadequate and the study design provided by government scientists to replace it is also flawed. Follow-up fish studies by the Alaska Department of Fish and Game have shown that the proponent’s fishery data was also flawed and incomplete. Based on those errors and the simple fact that the mine proposal has been found to be lacking in all of the previous categories relating to ecosystem well being, it is clear that the proponent’s project analysis is inadequate and fails under the Hodge sustainability criteria.
13. Time horizons used in the proponent’s analysis, program, and infrastructure design:
These do not affect sustainability given the overall failings of all other aspects of the proposal regarding ecosystem well being.
Assessment question 1.3:
Have the responsibilities for environmental concerns been fully and fairly assigned amongst the proponent, government and local community?
Indicators:
14. Proportion of environmental costs or concerns (through the full project life cycle) with clear responsibility assigned and
15. distribution of environmental responsibilities:
There is a clear failure here. The Project Committee and particularly the Provincial government have elected to rework the design of the proposal by studying mitigation and monitoring procedures on behalf of the proponent. That calls the fairness of the entire process in question and also raises concerns that mitigation measures that the proponent has not agreed to will be used to justify a proposal that cannot be justified on its own merits. Provincial money has subsidized the improvement of the proponent’s proposal in the areas of wildlife studies, impacts and mitigation; metals loading and mitigation measures in Shazah Slough; and effluent outflow design.
The full range of mitigation measures has not been released to the public, so it is impossible to determine who will be paying for them or whether the proponent has agreed to them. The public has no guarantees that these measures will be undertaken and the government record of ensuring compliance is dismal.
Without responsibilities clearly demarked, they ultimately fall to the public. That is clearly an unacceptable distribution of responsibilities in a private undertaking like the Tulsequah Chief mine.
Another concern, which will be raised in greater detail in the following section, is that State of Alaska is being asked to assume a degree of risk entirely disproportionate to any small benefit they might receive. For the project to be truly sustainable, the BC government would recognize the need to look at the proposal within the full watershed context and pay closer attention to the strong objections of Alaskans and particularly the fishing community.
Human Well-being
It is clear from indicators 1 through 15 that the Tulsequah Chief mine and road proposal is fundamentally flawed and would undermine rather than improve ecosystem well being in the short, medium and long terms. Since Hodge suggests that ecosystem well being cannot be traded off for human well being, there is already a basis for rejecting the project proposal outright. However, it is important to document the many potential negative repercussions that the project has for human well being, so we will continue with the analysis. The general question that Hodge begins with is “will the project result in the maintenance or improvement of human well-being?” The specific indicators within that general focus are as follows:
16. A community impact study has been completed to identify the value and array of social, cultural, health or heritage costs that could reasonably arise.
The information in the project proposal regarding community impacts is cursory at best at does not reflect the serious divisions in the Atlin community that have arisen due to this project proposal. The Staples/Poushinsky study is a much more useful document, but is more specific to the TRTFN and has not been incorporated into the community impact study prepared by the proponent.
As the TRTFN dissenting report highlights, “There is considerable accumulated information available about the impacts of industrial projects on small communities, including mines and access roads, to assist the proponent in this exercise. Unfortunately this body of social science and impact studies was ignored, with the result that the Report is full of erroneous assumptions and unwarranted conclusions.” (TRTFN, 1998: Community Impacts)
No mention is made of Alaska in the proponent’s report, and none of the severe impacts that a loss of the salmon fishery would have on Alaska communities is addressed in any way.
The proposal does not fulfill the Hodge sustainability criteria in this respect.
17. Health status (including self-assessed health):
Concerns have been raised about the demands that the massive increase in heavy truck traffic will have on emergency services in Atlin. The safety of drivers on the Atlin road will clearly be at greater risk. There are also considerations regarding the impacts on social cohesion and the violence that can result with the influx of highly paid outsiders. Green notes, “mining culture, being that of hard work and rough play, with frequent instances of violence amongst men and towards women, results in high levels of social distress and lessened ability of income to contribute to economic development.” (Green, 2001: 48) Drug and alcohol problems are likely to occur with greater frequency under these conditions, and the Redfern policy banning controlled substances and alcohol on the worksites will do nothing to control these impacts in the communities.
18. Cultural and heritage integrity (including as assessed by the TRT and the local community):
The TRTFN have been very clear that this project will adversely affect their culture and heritage in numerous ways. In their dissenting report they list impacts on the land-based Tlingit economy, direct negative impacts on the Tlingit heritage trail, trap line interference, and a series of profoundly negative sociocultural implications that stem from those impacts. For example, they state “….if Tlingit households become more dependent on cash income to meet their household requirements with a coincident decline in traditional land use and domestic production, it is likely that the Tlingit community will become less socially cohesive and more economically fragmented.” (TRTFN, 1998: Cultural Impacts) The proponent has done a very poor and incomplete job of assessing such impacts. Staples and Poushinsky also document direct and indirect impacts on specific cultural and spiritual sites, the adverse impacts of increased outside in-migration, and the various positive and negative impacts of the strengthening of the cash economy among TRTFN members and families. (Staples / Poushinsky, addendum, 1997)
The overall cultural impacts would be negative and thus the proposal fails in this aspect of Hodge’s sustainability lens.
19. Poverty and debt:
There is insufficient data to make a reasonable evaluation of the project’s impacts on poverty and debt. Certainly it is unreasonable to assume that any jobs that might be created by the mine reactivation and road construction would automatically contribute to the overall well being of Atlin inhabitants. As Staples and Poushinsky found, the influx of high paying, short term jobs can affect different members of the community in different ways:
“Mine workers, whether dislocated from existing businesses or new to the local employment scene, will be paid very well. Workers in existing jobs, who are committed to remaining in their chosen and long-term careers, will experience a shift from their current position, relative to other employed people in Atlin and the TRTFN community, to a situation where their incomes may be significantly less than those of the miners. In addition to the relative change that this represents, if local commodity prices rise to meet available incomes (whether of higher-paid consumers, or higher-cost workers in local businesses) or rise to accommodate the higher cost of labour, those with current employment may experience a decline in their buying power and thus an absolute loss to accompany the relative changes they experience.” (Staples / Poushinsky, addendum, 1997: Section 4.3.2)
20. Crime and sense of security:
Insufficient data to evaluate.
21. Sense of vulnerability, particularly cultural vulnerability, that might result from the project:
It is unnecessary to elaborate on what Staples and Poushinsky found in their report, but those findings can be summarized in the following quote: “…..the proposed road bisecting TRTFN traditional territory can be viewed as the most significant incursion since the gold rush, exacerbating a strong ongoing collective sense that, in spite of assertions of land ownership, their traditional lands continue to be alienated without TRTFN consent or control.” (Staples / Poushinsky, addendum, 1997: Section 4.1) In other words, the project must be seen to be profoundly negative in this respect.
22. Sense of consistency of the project with the local community’s (Taku River Tlingit and non-Tlingit local community) sense of desirable future of the community and region
The proponent’s report makes a vague and inaccurate reference to the division in the community between “….those who wish Atlin to stay essentially “as is” and those who would prefer to see more secure year-round employment and economic opportunity.” (Tulsequah Chief Project Report Executive Summary, Volume V) It should be clear to the Project Committee by now that while almost all residents of Atlin would like greater year-round employment and economic opportunity, the real division is between those who see that promise in this proposal and those that do not. The Society for Atlin’s Sustainable Economic Initiatives circulated a petition and managed to secure 109 signatures from Atlin residents opposed to the mine. The petition clearly stated that the undersigned supported “….the development of a dynamic and sustainable economy for our community.” They opposed the proposal since, “in advance of a community driven long-term economic development plan, the re-activation of the Tulsequah Chief Mine will compromise the socio-economic health of the region and its surrounding Watersheds.” (SASEI, 2001: one page petition)
The Taku River Tlingit First Nation has also made it abundantly clear that the proposal runs contrary to their sense of a desirable future for the community and the region. In their dissenting report they clearly state the negative ramifications as follows:
“…..TRTFN, unlike most other first nations in the province, still retains its natural resource endowment and opportunities for implementing its own vision of how the land should be used. Such opportunities will inevitably be thwarted if the road is built, since it will function as a powerful magnet for others seeking access to an unexploited, and largely unregulated, wilderness.” (TRTFN, 1998: Post Closure Issues)
The TRTFN have their own land use planning process under way and should be allowed to complete that future oriented process in order to approach development in this region from and informed and conscious perspective. Questionable and piecemeal industrial proposals like the Tulsequah Chief mine and road are the antithesis of such planning and are clearly contrary to sustainability under this category.
23. Education:
Insufficient data.
24. Satisfactory engagement in non-market activities (including the Tlingit’s land-based economy):
The profound negative impacts in this respect have been outlined under indicators 1-8, 11 and 18 and are detailed in the TRTFN dissenting report and the Staples Poushinsky document.
25. Satisfactory employment in the market economy:
It is difficult to assess whether the employment impacts of the mine will be satisfactory or not. On the one hand, if the mine actually does enter into production the proponent is promising wages at “about 10% over the provincial average for mining positions.” (Tulsequah Chief Project Report, Vol. V: Construction and Operations Employment Income). On the other hand, the Society for Atlin’s Sustainable Economic Initiatives has expressed concerns that the existing tourism economy will be affected. In a letter to the editor of the Yukon News, Wayne Merry stated, “The project also presents a threat to existing tourism-based businesses that have developed in recent years. Once the information about the heavy truck traffic on the Atlin Road hits the Milepost and beyond, there will be a major impact on drive-in tourism. Motor homes and camper vehicles in particular will avoid such traffic and therefore avoid Atlin.” Since tourism represents a long-term and sustainable employment option for Atlin whereas mining does not, the overall, long term employment impacts are likely to be negative.
The Green Report corroborates Merry’s concerns:
“Mining can often impede local economic development and diversification due to the cyclical nature of the industry, recognition of the limited lifespan of mining projects, workforce mobility, limited opportunities for upstream or downstream processing, mining skills being poorly transferable to other occupations, creation of a dependency mindset, corporate dominance of community affairs, wage expectations that cannot be met in other sectors, and ongoing requirements for government subsidies. If mining diminishes ecological entitlements available to residents, particularly indigenous peoples, or reduces their ability to meet their own needs, it impairs local economic prospects and human well-being. When local environmental amenities are degraded and prospects for enterprises that depend on a quality environment are diminished, local regimes lose their attractiveness as a place to live and do business. For economic diversification to occur in regions dependent on mining, long lead times before mine closure are required. Long mine life (e.g., 50-100 years) greatly enhances prospects for diversification.” (Green, 2001: 35)
The Tulsequah Chief mine is expected to be in operation for less than a decade, so any short term benefits in terms of jobs will be sharply offset in the medium and long term by the employment impacts chronicled by Green.
Any damage to the very valuable salmon fishery would also have serious negative employment consequences on the people of Juneau and other Alaska communities.
In this category too, the proposal is at odds with sustainability.
26. Adequacy of treatment of human concerns in terms of actions designed to (a) avoid, (b) mitigate, (c) compensate; and/or (d) offset through the full project life cycle:
Apart from some vague references to an Impact and Benefit Agreement with the TRTFN, this is another sadly neglected aspect of sustainability in the project proposal. The report makes passing reference to concerns about impacts on the tourism economy, but then makes an unsupported claim that the impacts will be minimal and provides no guarantee of compensation if the claim is false. No special measures are included to protect the growing tourism economy in Atlin. No Impacts and Benefits Agreement is mentioned involving non-TRTFN residents of Atlin. No mention is even made of the Alaskans that earn their living from the salmon run in the Taku. Therefore, the treatment of human concerns is clearly inadequate.
27. People’s sense of control over the factors that affect their future: The project review process has itself had a profoundly negative impact on local residents” sense of control over the factors that affect their future. The simple fact that a pro-mine decision was forced through in an accelerated fashion, ignoring substantial concerns in the areas of wildlife impacts and sustainability, has gravely shaken public confidence in this process. Since being forced by the courts to reconvene, the government members of the Project Committee have done very little to win back public favour. The public information sessions held in Juneau, Whitehorse and Atlin were poorly organized and structured and were held before a number of key documents relating to access impacts and mitigation measures were even on the table. The EAO has admitted “it is true that the project committee through the wildlife working group will use materials that are not available to the public” (personal correspondence from Sheila Wynn, December 18, 2001) but justifies the exclusion of information by arguing “This is often how environmental assessment proceeds under the Act. An issue is identified as the assessment is drawing to a close and then the project committee requires that the issue be further developed in order for it to make its conclusions.” (Ibid) The issue that Dr. Wynn suggests was identified as the assessment was drawing to a close is the issue of wildlife impacts and their mitigation. That issue was identified fourteen months earlier in the findings of Madame Justice Kirkpatrick as a substantial error in the first Recommendations Report.
Rather than build public confidence, the rushed public comment period over the busy Christmas season has further eroded people’s belief that this process is balanced, neutral and fair. The EAO and the Project Committee should have made a special effort to share information with the public and allow for meaningful public involvement. Instead they have created the impression that public comment is not valued in the process by closing the public comment period before documents relating to areas of substantial error in the first recommendations report are even tabled.
The Province’s steadfast insistence that this assessment go ahead in the absence of a completed land use plan or finalized treaty negotiation is specifically detrimental to the sense among Tlingit people that their control over their territories and destiny is being respected. “The road will preclude the substantial opportunities presently available to TRTFN in shaping their own visions for land use and treaty settlement.” (TRTFN, 1998: unpaginated)
It is also noteworthy that the Governor of Alaska’s continued calls for joint watershed planning in the Taku “….before development permits are issued” (Knowles, Press Release, 12/05/01) have been ignored in this process. His call represents the demands of the Alaska fishing community that their livelihood not be recklessly placed at risk by a decision in which they can not participate.
In this category, the process as well as the proposal is in particularly grievous violation of the Hodge sustainability criteria.
Assessment question 2.2: Have all key human implications been considered and accounted for?
Indicators:
28. An assessment for Atlin (Tlingit and non-Tlingit communities) has been conducted which identifies and evaluates potential social, cultural, and economic impacts of the project to the community as well as opportunities for positive contribution:
As noted in indicator 16, no such assessment has been carried out. Optimistic references to employment hours and vague mention of an Impacts and Benefits Agreement for the TRTFN in no way fulfill the requirements of this category. The profound concerns of TRTFN and other Atlin residents continue to be largely ignored.
The project proposal is an utter failure in this respect.
29. Proportion of key human concerns that have been adequately considered by the proponent:
As noted above, the proposal is profoundly flawed in this respect. The wide range of cultural, economic and social impacts are not even identified, let alone addressed in the proponent’s report. Sociocultural impacts on the TRTFN and the severe economic and social disruptions resulting from the fundamental change proposed for the Atlin community as a whole are, if mentioned at all, downplayed without substantiation.
30. Adequacy of time horizons used in analysis, program, and infrastructure design:
The proposal’s Project Report does not look at socio-economic impacts beyond the closure of the mine. Those impacts are frequently considerable in their distorting and damaging impacts on the economy. Green noted the following reasons why mining has often hampered rather than promoted long term, local economic development:
• businesses and individuals limit exposure to cyclical downturns and to eventual exhaustion of the ore body, by avoiding investments in mining-dependent regions;
• mobility of mining workforce discourages long-term investment by businesses and individuals living in the region;
• mine viability and lifespan is dependent on volatile mineral prices and many projects must be abandoned suddenly and with little or no notice to the local community;
• mining company dominance in the local economy and politics encourages dependency; corporations benefit from dependency because it weakens labour and local government’s bargaining position; poor bargaining positions allow more of the resource rent to be captured by the corporation;
• the mining industry has been faced with a long-term decline in resource prices;
• the mining industry has frequently been heavily subsidized by government through outright payments, preferential loans, the provision of infrastructure, preferential utility rates, reduced royalties and an ability to externalize social and environmental costs;
• heritage funds or other measures to spread the benefits of non-renewable resource exploitation over several generations (where they exist) have been squandered, dissipated through dividends or to reduce taxes, or often invested in other jurisdictions thereby limiting the potential to diversify the economy and wean government and the economy off revenue derived from extraction;
• substantial investments in infrastructure are typically abandoned or written off when the mine is closed;
• poor linkages between mining and the rest of the economy;
• the major decisions affecting the region are made in distant corporate headquarters and reflect international markets, removing local sense of control and responsibility;
• in most mining communities there are few prospects for downstream development (processing the ore) or upstream development (supplying the mine with goods and services);
• mining skills are not easily transferable to other workplaces;
• miners become used to above average wages and often leave the region when the mine closes to move on to another mining project;
• mining towns are built and managed with a narrow emphasis on creating conditions that are conducive to the efficient extraction of mineral resources to meet the financial targets of resource companies. This limits the ability of women to participate in community decision making, limits their prospects to participate in economic development, limits the social roles available to women and severely limits the role of women to that of providers of support so as to enhance social stability;
• earnings and royalties usually do not remain in the region where the resources are extracted;
• the environmental legacy of mining detracts from the quality of life or hinders other economic activities;
• inadequate provisions for reclamation, restoration and clean-up burden governments with environmental liabilities that can quickly exceed available funds;
• mining companies take advantage of cyclical downturns to reduce the expectations of the workforce, local communities, and government, so as to gain concessions, and;
• mining culture, being that of hard work and rough play, with frequent instances of violence amongst men and towards women, results in high levels of social distress and lessened ability of income to contribute to economic development.
(from Green, 2001:47-48)
Since none of those factors are addressed or even mentioned in the proponent’s report, it is clear that the time horizons for the “assessment” are as inadequate as the community impacts assessment itself.
Assessment question 2.3: Have responsibilities been fully and fairly assigned?
Indicators:
31. Proportion of social concerns (through the full project life cycle) with clear responsibility assigned:
There is no need to detail the proponent’s failings in this regard any further. The social concerns are not recognized or addressed, so clear responsibility has not been assigned. The proposal fails under this indicator of sustainability as well.
32. Distribution of human-related responsibilities:
When an industrial proposal is imposed from the outside on a First Nation that clearly opposes the project and a non-native community that is increasingly bitterly divided over the project, the onus should clearly fall on the imposing proponent and non-First Nations governments to take responsibility for the human impacts of the project. That is nowhere evident in the proposal or in the public presentations made by government officials. Again, the proposed project fails to live up to the demands of sustainability.
Assessment question 2.4: Is the expected distribution of costs, benefits, and risks fair and equitable?
Indicators:
33. an equity assessment has been completed addressing all key communities of interest including proponent, the Taku River Tlingit, the local non-Tlingit people and the provincial government
There is no indication that such an assessment has been completed and a key community of interest, the people of Alaska, are not mentioned anywhere in the Project Report.
34. formal mechanisms have be established in the form of agreements between the proponent, the Taku River Tlingit, the local non-Tlingit people, and the provincial government to ensure a fair distribution of costs, benefits, and risks from the project
Such mechanisms have not been formalized. The proponent refers to negotiation of an impacts and benefits agreement with the Taku River Tlingit First Nation, but no such agreement has been negotiated. In fact, the TRTFN call into question the validity of that approach to dealing with costs and risks to them as a First Nation stating “no meaningful mitigation or compensation measures are in place or even plausible.” There is not even any mention of an impacts and benefits agreement for non-Tlingit Atlin residents. The people of Southeast Alaska have no guarantees of any compensation in the case of adverse impacts on the salmon fishery.
Overall, the project proposal fails badly in this category of sustainability.
35. formal mechanisms (agreements, institutional arrangements, and resources) are in place to ensure that benefits arising from the project are harnessed to achieve a continuing source of benefits for those affected after the project is gone.
As mentioned under indicator 30, the proponent has not taken a long-term perspective in terms of benefits or adverse human impacts of the project. Vague mention is made of the benefits derived from employment and training at all stages of the construction, operation and decommissioning of the mine and road, but post-closure benefits to the community are essentially nil and the proponent’s report reflects that.
Assessment question 2.5: Have the project-related engagement processes involving the Taku River Tlingit and the local non-Tlingit people been effective and fair?
Indicators:
36. A fair and effective engagement strategy has been designed and implemented in a collaborative process led by the proponent but involving all the communities of interest in a way that is satisfactory to the communities of interest:
This has not happened since the project was reconvened. The proponent has effectively disengaged from the process while the province has taken up the work of ameliorating the many flaws in the project proposal. The public information sessions in the communities of Atlin, Whitehorse and Juneau were held prior to the completion of key documents; were poorly organized, advertised and executed; and highlighted the levels of discontent in all three communities rather than address concrete concerns.
37. The programs and plans that have been identified to address human and ecological concerns have been reviewed and supported by the community.
This is not the case. As mentioned many times throughout this document, the mitigation and monitoring measures that are being used to justify this mine are not included in the proponent’s report. In fact, many of them were developed as a result of research by the provincial government to mitigate clear problems identified with the project as proposed by the proponent. Unfortunately, the full list of mitigation measures has not been made available to the public in order to garner their support. The costs of those measures and clear evidence that the proponent is willing to assume those costs have also not been made available.
To the contrary, the EAO has asserted that they have no responsibility to supply the public with such information. Dr. Sheila Wynn stated that the wildlife working group of the Project Committee has sought an update of a LUCO document from 1997 “….to provide them some assistance in drawing conclusions on the effectiveness of proposed mitigation measures.” (Wynn, correspondence with the TWA, 12/18/01: 3) Hodge clearly feels that sharing such information with the public is essential prior to project approval for the process to address sustainability criteria. Dr. Wynn clearly does not, since she continues in the same letter: “This letter will not be available during the public comment period.” (Ibid)
Procedurally as well as substantively, the assessment of the Tulsequah Chief mine and road proposal fails both sustainability criteria and the legitimate expectations of the BC public.
38. The informed and voluntary support for the project from the Taku River Tlingit and the local non-Tlingit people has been attained:
This is clearly not the case. The TRTFN have continued to raise strong objections and their position on the mine in advance of the completion of their land use plan and a signed treaty is well known. A large number of people in Atlin are opposed to the mine and road and have not had their concerns taken seriously. That is evidenced by the many concerns raised at the December public meeting and the strongly supported petition that was circulated and submitted to the MLA Dennis Mackay by the Society for Atlin’s Sustainable Economic Initiatives. The results of the Dec. 4 public meeting in Juneau, where not a single public comment was made in favour of the mine, clearly demonstrate the widespread opposition to the mine there.
39. Mechanisms and means are in place to ensure that a fair and comprehensive engagement strategy will be implemented throughout the full project life cycle.
This has not been the case thus far and no such mechanisms are in place in the project report.
40. The Taku River Tlingit and local non-Tlingit community will have in place the institutional arrangements with government and the proponent to ensure the effective use of local communities” capacity.
The provincial government has spoken repeatedly about mitigation measures and monitoring, but they have not even made a full list of mitigation measures public, let alone speak to how the public might get involved in those measures. There has been no attempt to make effective use of the local communities’ capacity and there is no evidence that that will change in the future.
3. Governance and the Success of Market and Non-market Activities
Assessment question 3.1: Will the success of non-market activities be maintained or augmented?
Indicators:
41. the ecological base of the non-market economy will be maintained or enhanced (see indicators 1-8)
Since the proposal failed in every indicator category from 1 through 8, it follows that it will not maintain or improve the ecological base of the non-market economy.
42. a reasonable degree of certainty exists that participation in the land-based economy will continue in the way that is sought by the Taku River Tlingit and the local non-Tlingit people.
The sustainability failures of the proposal under indicators 1-8, 11 and 18 conclusively show that there is more than a reasonable degree of certainty that participation in the land-based economy will NOT continue in a way that is sought by the Taku River Tlingit and the local non-Tlingit people in British Columbia and Alaska.
Assessment question 3.2: Will the success of activities within the market economy be maintained or augmented?
Indicators:
43. projected direct and indirect employment opportunities
See the Tulsequah Chief Project Report, Volume V, under the headings Construction and Operations.
44. projected direct and indirect wages generated
See the Tulsequah Chief Project Report, Volume V, under the heading Construction and Operations Employment Income.
45. potential government revenue from the project has been projected and compared to projected costs to be incurred
Potential government revenues are indicated in the Tulsequah Chief Project Report, Volume V, under the heading Revenue. That projection is based on the optimistic assumptions about mine viability that are made in the same report. The analysis by mineral economist Tom Bartek suggests that the Tulsequah Chief is marginal to submarginal in economic terms (Bartek, 1998), calling the proponent’s figures into question. Accurate figures are essential so that the public can make their own assessment of how the tax revenues generated should the mine ever enter into operation would compare to the many costs that have accrued and will continue to accrue relating to mitigation measures, monitoring and enforcement as well as road and other infrastructure upgrades necessitated by the project. People also need this information to determine for themselves whether the project is worth the grave ecological harm that will result from it, the adverse impacts on the Atlin community and specifically the Taku River Tlingit people, and the risk of liability that is being assumed on their behalf by the Province.
The EAO has been reluctant to provide the public with full information regarding mitigation measures and the proponent’s commitment to them, so such calculations are impossible.
Assessment question 3.3: Are the institutional arrangements in place that provide reasonable confidence that the capacity to address project consequences will continue to exist through out the full project life cycle including post closure?
Indicators:
46. the proponent will have in place the commitment, personnel, resources, operating procedures, plans, delivery programs, monitoring and reporting programs, contingency plans, instruments of surety (financial), overall management systems, closure plans and enforcement capacity to ensure that commitments will be honoured throughout the full project life cycle through to post closure
The only way to ensure that the proponent will live up to commitments made is to have a bonding requirement that adequately reflects the full cost of remediation and clean up. As mentioned in our attached document on bonding, it is essential to calculate at least a rough figure for the bond required and assess the proponent’s capacity to pay before coming to a decision on Mine Certification. Since that has not taken place, this fails to meet the Hodge sustainability criteria.
Proper assessment of the impact of the project on wildlife and the TRTFN use of wildlife was another substantive failure identified by Madame Justice Kirkpatrick in her Judicial Review. Five independent biologists submitted criticisms of the wildlife information included in the first project report. Since the Project Committee was reconvened, Ministry of Water, Land and Air Protection biologists have stepped in to attempt to remedy the flawed information provided by the proponent. It is unclear why the government has taken over the proponent’s responsibility to address wildlife impacts from the proposed project, but the studies undertaken by the Province remain insufficient. The TWA contracted Robert Hayes, a biologist with 20 years of experience working for the Yukon Fish and Wildlife Branch to assess the adequacy of current monitoring programs. His complete report is included with this submission, but his conclusions warrant brief mention here:
“The current design lacks essential ingredients of contemporary environmental assessment including: testable predictions about effects on wildlife, control areas, environmental monitoring, and the use of risk models and power analysis to set effect sizes. Most of these deficiencies were identified by earlier reviews but nothing was done to develop these objectives into an experimental approach.
Ungulate studies could also benefit from the same cumulative effects approach that is being used for grizzly bear monitoring. Without these ingredients the monitoring design is inadequate to detect and mitigate negative effects of the project on the large mammal community.” (Hayes, 2002: Conclusions).
Whether or not the monitoring and mitigation of is taken on as a public subsidy to the proponent, the study design does not allow for impacts to be effectively tracked and mitigated. Again, the proposal and the mitigation measures proposed by the proponent and the Province fly in the face of their own sustainability criteria.
47. The government will have in place the commitment, personnel, resources, operating procedures, plans, delivery programs monitoring and reporting programs, contingency plans, instruments of surety (financial), overall management systems, and enforcement capacity to ensure that commitments will be honoured throughout the full project life cycle through to post closure:
On all counts the provincial government fails to meet sustainability criteria. Recent studies have decisively demonstrated the failure of the government to monitor and enforce the Forest Practices Code, the Waste Management Act, the Mines Act, and conditions for approval through the Environmental Assessment Act with regard to environmental protection. (see EMCBC, 2001; Forest Practices Board, 2000; and Harper and Quigley (DFO), 2000) Worse still, there are documented examples like the Kemess South Mine in northeastern British Columbia where provincial ministries were found to have intentionally relaxed their own involvement and enforcement of environmental regulations in a situation where clear infractions were taking place:
“Government’s response to the reporting of significant breaches was inadequate and uncoordinated. The Ministry of Energy and Mines re-issued previously ineffective compliance orders under the Mines Act. The Ministry of Forests continued to restrict enforcement to short access roads administered under special use permits and failed to enforce the requirements for stream protection, deactivation of roads and removal of temporary bridges along the power line right-of-way. The Ministry of Environment, Lands and Parks chose to severely restrict its involvement to offering technical advice. The government’s response did not address the widespread non-compliance and environmental harm reported along the entire power line.” (Forest Practices Board, 2000: ii)
As with the Tulsequah Chief, the Kemess South Mine involves a linear corridor being constructed into a remote region for a mine with questionable economic viability.
Furthermore, there is no reason to assume that monitoring and enforcement will improve in the short or medium term. The present government has begun to implement staff cuts in the civil service that will continue until at least 2004 and will likely reduce the civil service by 28% according to the government’s own numbers. Minister of Energy and Mines Richard Neufeld, recently explained in an open letter to mining industry stakeholders how the cuts will affect his Ministry. He declares that as a result of a “Core Services Review” his ministry has been “…….authorized to focus efforts on fostering investment in British Columbia.” (Neufeld, Dec. 4, 2001: MEM website)
In other words, we can expect enforcement and monitoring to be even worse in the future than it has been in the past. This category has to be seen as a particularly grave failure of the Tulsequah Chief proposal to meet the Hodge sustainability criteria.
48. The Taku River Tlingit will have in place the commitment, personnel, resources, operating procedures, plans, delivery programs, monitoring and reporting programs, contingency plans, instruments of surety (financial), overall management systems, and enforcement capacity to ensure that commitments will be honoured throughout the full project life cycle through to post closure
The Taku River Tlingit First Nation will undoubtedly continue to be the stewards of their territory that they have traditionally been. However, we have seen no indication that the objections that they raised to the first Recommendations Report have been addressed. They stated then that, “…..we cannot affirm that we have in place the necessary mitigation measures, including monitoring programs, that will ensure sound environmental management of the project.” (TRTFN, 1998: Introduction) Given that Madame Justice Kirkpatrick identified the failure to address Tlingit sustainability concerns as a substantive failure of the first Recommendations Report, this remains a fatal flaw in the proposal with regard to sustainability criteria.
49. The local non-Tlingit community will have in place the commitment, personnel, resources, operating procedures, plans, delivery programs, monitoring and reporting programs, contingency plans, instruments of surety (financial), overall management systems, and enforcement capacity to ensure that commitments will be honoured throughout the full project life cycle through to post closure.
There is no evidence that any such measures or considerations are in place with regards to this project in Atlin or in Southeast Alaska.
50. An analysis of local and regional land use has been undertaken and whether formalized or not in a regional land use plan, has shown that current or future regional land or watershed planning initiatives are not significantly constrained by the project.
On the contrary, the Province has pressed ahead with this assessment insisting that a local or regional land use plan is not necessary to the decision. Hodge does not require a land use plan in the formal sense, but since no analysis has been completed that would permit the conclusion that current or future regional land or watershed planning initiatives are not significantly constrained by the project, there is no informal basis for finding the project proposal to meet sustainability criteria either. The Taku River Tlingit have a land use planning process underway and have stated, “…..we must understand clearly how the land and its natural processes work before we consider an activity that may cause disruption.” (TRTFN, brochure Ha Tlatgi “Ha Kustiyi, no date) The Project Committee’s own commissioned report on the TRTFN traditional land use concluded “the road will preclude the substantial opportunities presently available to TRTFN in shaping their own visions for land use and treaty settlement.” (Staples and Poushinsky, 1997: unpaginated web version)
The State of Alaska has consistently asked for binational watershed planning as a way to ensure the protection of resources key to Canada and the United States. Most recently, in a press release on Dec. 5, 2001 Governor Knowles reiterated his strong position that:
“The State of Alaska has been working on issues relating to the Tulsequah mine project for over 7 years, but nothing to date gives us confidence that our concerns for protecting Taku River salmon and their habitat have been addressed. Given the number of unresolved environmental issues associated with this project, we continue to believe that a binational comprehensive plan for the entire Taku River watershed needs to be developed before actions irrevocably change this important river.” (Knowles, Press release, 12/05/01)
The consistent refusal by Canada and British Columbia to allow for an International Joint Commission referral on this project flies in the face of sustainability at the watershed level.
Resources are earmarked for establishing a framework for dispute resolution related to issues arising from the project.
Such resources have not been earmarked in the project proposal or, to our knowledge, by the provincial or federal governments. Unless such resources are available, the Tulsequah Chief proposal fails with respect to this sustainability criterion.
Conclusions:
The Hodge sustainability lens was commissioned by the Project Committee and delivered to them in May of 2001. Its focus is quite different from that of the Green report in that it attempted to provide a lens for analysing sustainability rather than coming to any conclusions about the specific sustainability of the Tulsequah Chief mine and road proposal. Hodge did not incorporate key elements of sustainability including global economic and resource considerations, but those are more than adequately addressed in Tom Green’s excellent report and have not been examined here. This report has taken the sustainability criteria as defined by Hodge, and assessed the Tulsequah Chief mine and road proposal using that criteria.
The Tulsequah Chief mine and road proposal and the process to assess it fail in at least 45 of the 51 sustainability lens indicators provided by Hodge. In the remaining six categories, the indicators are ambiguous or there is insufficient information to gage impacts on sustainability. The project does not provide unambiguous evidence of the maintenance or enhancement of sustainability under any of the 51 sustainability criteria. Furthermore, the failings of the proposal are uniform across the categories of Ecosystem Well Being, Human Well Being, and Governance and the Success of Market and Non-Market Activities. Hodge stated as a general tenet, and the TWA fully agrees, that mining projects, to be sustainable, must be demonstrably positive in their contribution to overall human and ecological well being. In this case, the project is demonstrably negative in its impacts on human and ecological well being in the short, medium and long terms.
Hodge also insists that human well being can not be traded off for ecological well being, or vice versa. That consideration is not relevant, since this document clearly demonstrates the project’s failings in both categories. However the TWA would like to elaborate that it is an even more egregious disservice to the concept of sustainability to value the well being of certain sectors of human society, in this case mining and other industrial resource interests, over ecosystem well being and the welfare of local cultures and communities. To decide in favour of the mine would clearly serve the government’s interests in “… making the province one of the most attractive jurisdictions for mining and mineral exploration in North America.” (Neufeld, EM website, 12/04/01) However, that goal would have been achieved in this case at the expense of ecological integrity, environmental protection, and the health and well being of local communities in British Columbia and Alaska. It would also be done in direct contravention of the legislated purpose of the British Columbia Environmental Assessment Act in section 2(a) and the legislated purpose of the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act under section 4(b).
A third and final Hodge sustainability tenet is that there be acceptance of the validity of the project by those most affected. That goal has not been achieved in the community of Atlin, with regard to the Taku River Tlingit First Nation, or in the fishing community or among the population at large in Southeast Alaska. On the contrary, there is clear evidence that the concerns of those communities have been exacerbated by a flawed proposal and an equally flawed and unnecessarily protracted process where taxpayers’ resources were increasingly drawn upon in an apparent attempt to mitigate and monitor the proposal into acceptability. Even as the process has been steered away from the legislated requirement “….to provide an open, accountable and neutrally administered process” (BCEAA Sec. 2(d)) in an increasingly desperate attempt to justify approval, it has failed in that respect. Neither the proponent, nor the provincial or federal governments have been able to convincingly demonstrate that the project would be anything other than a financial burden on taxpayers, an ecological disaster, and a source of serious economic, social and cultural disruption to the community of Atlin, the Taku River Tlingit First Nation and the surrounding region.
That the project made it this far in the assessment process in spite of such grave shortcomings with regard to a legislated purpose of the Environmental Assessment Act calls into question the commitment to sustainability that exists within the Environmental Assessment Office in British Columbia. Public confidence in that office has already been profoundly shaken by the Supreme Court judgement against the Province for the procedural and substantive errors behind their first rushed and sloppy approval of this profoundly flawed project. That confidence can only now be regained if the Project Committee accepts the overwhelming evidence of the project’s shortcomings and rejects this proposal.
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Bibliography:
All cited documents are directly related to Tulsequah Chief proceedings and will be recognizable to Project Committee members except the following few:
Environmental Mining Council of BC and West Coast Environmental Law, 2001.Undermining the Law: Addressing the Crisis in Compliance with Environmental Mining Laws in BC. Victoria, BC and Vancouver, BC.
Forest Practices Board, 2000. Significant Breaches of the Forest Practices Code along the Power Line Corridor for the Kemess South Mine. Special Investigation 99002. June, Victoria, BC. http://www.fpb.gov.bc.ca
Harper, D.J. and J.T. Quigley, 2000: No Net Loss of Fish Habitat: An Audit of Forest Road Crossings of Fish-Bearing Streams in British Columbia, (1996-1999). Department of Fisheries and Oceans Technical Report. Vancouver, BC.
Knowles, Tony, 2001. Knowles Renews Concerns Over Protecting Taku Salmon. News Release. Dec. 5, Juneau.
Ministry of Environment, Lands and Parks 2000 Environmental Trends in British Columbia. Bienniel. Victoria, BC, http://www.env.gov.bc.ca/sppl/soerpt
Neufeld, Richard, 2001. Ministry of Energy and Mines public letter. Dec. 4, Victoria, BC, http://www.em.gov.bc.ca/
Taku River Tlingit First Nation, nd. Ha Tlatgi – Ha Kustiyi: Our Land – Our Way of Life. Brochure. Atlin, BC.